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Abstract—Physical-layer key generation (PKG) based on chan-
nel reciprocity has recently emerged as a new technique to
establish secret keys between devices. Most works focus on
pairwise communication scenarios with single or small-scale
antennas. However, the fifth generation (5G) wireless communica-
tions employ massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) to
support multiple users simultaneously, bringing serious overhead
of reciprocal channel acquisition. This paper presents a multi-
user secret key generation in massive MIMO wireless networks.
We provide a beam domain channel model, in which different
elements represent the channel gains from different transmit
directions to different receive directions. Based on this channel
model, we analyze the secret key rate and derive a closed-form
expression under independent channel conditions. To maximize
the sum secret key rate, we provide the optimal conditions for the
Kronecker product of the precoding and receiving matrices and
propose an algorithm to generate these matrices with pilot reuse.
The proposed optimization design can significantly reduce the
pilot overhead of the reciprocal channel state information acqui-
sition. Furthermore, we analyze the security under the channel
correlation between user terminals (UTs), and propose a low
overhead multi-user secret key generation with non-overlapping
beams between UTs. Simulation results demonstrate the near-
optimal performance of the proposed precoding and receiving
matrices design and the advantages of the non-overlapping beam
allocation.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secret key generation,
multi-user massive MIMO, beam domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer key generation (PKG) has emerged as a
promising technique to share the symmetric key for crypto-
graphic applications [1]. Based on the reciprocity of the uplink
and downlink channels, the communication ends, named Alice
and Bob, can establish a pair of common channel information.
When the channel information is converted into symmetric
keys, Alice and Bob can use them for cryptography to safe-
guard data communication. The secret keys can be regularly
updated, since the channel information varies randomly over
time. Furthermore, due to channel decorrelation effect [2], any
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eavesdropper, named Eve, located half a wavelength away
or more from Alice and Bob, will observe an uncorrelated
channel information [3]. Thus, Eve cannot infer the secret key
based on her own channel observations.
The key distribution is usually handled by the traditional
public key cryptography techniques, which however have been
facing a number of challenges to be applied in the future
networks. Firstly, public key needs to be distributed to different
devices in advance, and the key distribution for massive
devices is complicated [4]. Secondly, the distributed key for
each device usually does not update for a long time which may
incur security issues. Thirdly, the public key cryptography may
be compromised by the emerging quantum computers in the
future [5]. Key generation can thus be a good alternative to
complement when the public key cryptography is not suitable.
The PKG process generally contains four stages, namely
channel probing, quantization, information reconciliation, and
privacy amplification. At the beginning, Alice and Bob al-
ternately transmit pilot signals to obtain correlated channel
measurements. Then, they quantize these analog channel mea-
surements into digital bits. Although the uplink and down-
link channels are reciprocal, due to the calibration errors
in uplink/downlink RF chains, the temporal variation of the
channel and the noise, the measurements of the uplink and
downlink channel are not identical but highly correlated. Next,
information reconciliation is used to enable Alice and Bob
to agree on the same key through error detection protocols
or error correction codes [6]. Finally, privacy amplification
eliminates any potential information leakage to eavesdroppers.
Based on channel reciprocity, the channel probing stage
shares the common random sources between legitimate users
to generate the secret keys. Most PKG implementations are
realized in the time division duplex (TDD) mode in order
to utilize the channel reciprocity. Specifically, Alice and
Bob alternately transmit the probing signals to estimate the
channel state information (CSI), where the sampling time
difference between them should be smaller than the channel
coherence time, indicating that the coherence time limits the
pilot overhead. As the pilot overhead scales linearly with the
number of antennas, single antenna or small-scale multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) communication systems, which
is considered in most of the existing PKG schemes [7], have
enough time and frequency resources to obtain the highly
correlated CSI for pairwise communication scenarios.
The fifth generation (5G) and beyond communication sys-
tems employ massive MIMO technologies to support ex-
tremely high throughput and multiple users [8]. However, it
2is challenging to apply PKG with massive MIMO [9]. As
the number of antennas is extremely large in massive MIMO
systems, it is impractical for the base station (BS) and the
user terminal (UT) to estimate the instantaneous uplink and
downlink channel information within the coherence time. In
some quasi-static scenarios, the coherence time may be long
enough for pairwise channel estimations. However, the channel
varies slowly such that the adjacent measurements are highly
correlated, which will introduce redundancy and may finally
result in failure of key generation. In the previous work, the
self-correlation is eliminated by introducing signal prepro-
cessing procedure after channel sounding, such as principal
component analysis (PCA) [3]. This procedure also introduces
great complexity due to the large data dimension.
Massive MIMO exploits spatial diversity and spatial sig-
natures by allocating different beams/angles of transmitted
signal to different directions of users, which enables multi-
user communications. Key generation usually occurs between
a pair of users. Exploiting massive MIMO for multi-user key
generation will not be a straightforward extension from the
pairwise key generation. This exploration is currently missing
but very important as multi-user secret communications are
very demanding.
This paper aims to address the above challenges by gener-
ating secret key with multi-users simultaneously in a narrow
band massive MIMO system. In particular, we first state the
problems for intuitively expanding existing key generation
schemes in a multi-user massive MIMO scenario and then
propose a new channel dimensionality reduction (CDR) based
key generation scheme to address these problems. The main
contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• We propose a novel CDR-based key generation scheme
exploiting sparse property of the beam domain channel
model. Legitimate users only need to estimate the ef-
fective channels at a few dominate beams, therefore the
pilots lengths and channel auto-correlations are largely
reduced. Furthermore, we derive a closed-form expres-
sion of the secret key rate, considering other UTs as non-
colluding curious users.
• We present an optimization approach to realize the max-
imal sum secret key rate under the pilot reuse case
where different UTs transmit the identical pilot sig-
nals. Specifically, we design the precoding and receiving
matrices to reduce the inter-user interference for muti-
user communications. The proposed approach reduces the
pilot overhead that scales with the number of UTs.
• We provide a security analysis considering the spatial
channel correlations between UTs, and reveal that the
channel information on the overlapping beams may cause
serious information leakage and provide little secret key
rate. Therefore, we propose a holistic multi-user secret
key generation scheme, where the BS allocates non-
overlapping beams to different UTs and multiple UTs can
simultaneously generate secret keys with the BS using
non-overlapping beams. Numerical results demonstrate
the performance improvement of our proposed multi-user
secret key generation scheme.
The material in this paper has been partially accepted by
IEEE ICC 2020. In our previous work, we focus on the pilot
reuse case, and proposed a beam-domain secret key generation
approach which can reduce the channel dimension and the
pilot overhead in a multi-user massive MIMO system. In this
paper, we consider a general multi-user secret key generation
framework and provide a general secret key rate, containing
both the orthogonal pilot and the reused pilot cases. We prove
the optimality of our proposed algorithm in the reused pilot
case. Furthermore, we add a security analysis by considering
the channel correlation and conduct that the BS employing
non-overlapping beams to generate secret keys with different
UTs.
We use the following notation throughout the paper: Upper
(lower) bold-face letters denote matrices (column vectors); I
denotes the identity matrix while its subscript, if needed, rep-
resents its dimensionality. Let ei = [0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0]
denote a unit vector with the ith unit element and λi(A)
represent the ith sorted eigenvalue of matrix A. The su-
perscripts (·)H , (·)T , (·)∗ stand for the conjugate-transpose,
transpose, and conjugate of a matrix, respectively. We use E{·}
to denote ensemble expectation and tr(·), det(·) to represent
matrix trace and determinant operations, respectively. The
vec(·) operator stacks the columns of a matrix into a tall
vector, and the symbol ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of
two matrices. The inequalityA  0means thatA is Hermitian
positive semi-definite. We use [A]m,n to denote the (m,n)-
th element of matrix A. The covariance matrix of combined
random vectors is defined as Rz1z2···zNz = E{zzH}, where
z =
[
z
T
1 , z
T
2 , · · · , zTNz
]T
.
II. RELATED WORK
There are very few papers working on key generation with
massive MIMO. The work in [10] employed new channel
characteristics, e.g., virtual angle of arrival (AoA) and angle of
departure (AoD), to generate a shared secret key between two
devices. Furthermore, Jiao et al added a small perturbation an-
gle into the AoA of the transmitter as the common randomness
to improve the secret key rate constrained by low dynamic of
the channel [11]. However, these works only focus on the AoA
and AoD to generate the secret key, while the optimal design
maximizing the secret key rate is missing.
While pairwise key generation has been extensively in-
vestigated, group and multi-user key generation yet receives
less attention [1]. Note that, although both schemes have
multiple users participating in the key generation process, we
distinguish them in this paper. In the group key generation,
all of the users share a common secret key. The multi-user
key generation studied in this paper, refers to a particular
case that that each BS-UT pair has a different secret key.
Among the existing group key generation protocols [12],
[13], the majority of them still perform channel probing in
a pairwise manner, resulting in an extremely large overhead
and low efficiency. Hence, those works related to PKG among
multiple nodes through the optimization of probing rates at
individual node pair and channel probing schedule do not
scale in this context [14]. In the multi-user key generation,
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Fig. 1. System model of multi-user secret key generation.
Zhang et al cleverly exploited the multi-user mechanism of
OFDMA modulation by assigning non-overlapping subcarriers
to different users [15]. However, there is no work exploiting
the spatial diversity of massive MIMO to enable multi-user
key generation.
Therefore, there is a clear need to investigate key generation
with massive MIMO with special consideration to the multi-
user applications, in both theoretical analysis on the secret key
rate and the design of practical protocols.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper considers a narrow-band star topology net-
work, where a BS simultaneously generates secret keys κ =
{κ1, κ2, · · · , κK} with K UTs, as shown in Fig. 1. The BS is
equipped with M antennas and the kth UT is equipped with
Nk antennas. In the 5G and beyond wireless communications,
massive MIMO is the key technology to increase the transmis-
sion rate. Under the TDD operation, based on the reciprocal
uplink and downlink channels, the BS generates the pairwise
key κk with the kth UT.
We consider passive eavesdropping here and the active
attacks are out of scope in this paper. Specifically, an eaves-
dropper wants to eavesdrop the secret key in the set of κ
based on her own channel observations and all the information
exchanged over the public channel. As a general assumption
in PKG, we assume that Eve is located at least half wavelength
away from BS and all of the UTs, because half wavelength
is very close, e.g., 6.25 cm for 2.4GHz and Eve might
get detected within a distance below that. Therefore, Eve’s
channel observations are assumed to be independent of that
between the BS and UTs. Besides of Eve, we also consider
the potential unintended hearing from other UTs. When two
UTs are located close to each other, they may have correlated
channel observations. These UTs are treated as curious users,
i.e., each of them does not intend to eavesdrop keys of other
users. They also do not collude with other UTs or Eve.
The secret keys are extracted from the reciprocal wireless
channel information. Thus, we will first introduce the channel
model and then state the problems and challenges in multi-user
massive MIMO key generation.
A. Channel Model
We consider a geometric channel model with NP paths.
Then, the Nk × M physical MIMO channel matrix in the
downlink associated with the pth path of the kth UT can be
expressed as [16]
H
DL
k,p = αk,paUT,k(θk,p)a
H
BS(ϕk,p), (1)
where αk,p is the complex gain of the pth path, aUT,k(θk,p)
is the UT antenna array response vector with the AoA θk,p,
and aBS(ϕk,p) is the BS antenna array response vector corre-
sponding to AoD ϕk,p. Specifically, under the uniform linear
array (ULA) setup, these vectors are given by
aUT,k(θk,p) =
1√
Nk
[
1, e−j
2pi
λ
d sin(θk,p), . . . ,
e−j(Nk−1)
2pi
λ
d sin(θk,p)
]T
aBS(ϕk,p) =
1√
M
[
1, e−j
2pi
λ
d sin(ϕk,p), . . . ,
e−j(M−1)
2pi
λ
d sin(ϕk,p)
]T
, (2)
where λ is the wavelength, and d is the distance between
the adjacent antennas. For a narrow-band channel model, the
channel response of the kth UT can be expressed as
H
DL
k =
NP∑
p=1
H
DL
k,p . (3)
The channel covariance matrices at the BS and the UT sides
are defined as
RBS,k = E{(HDLk )HHDLk }, (4)
RUT,k = E{HDLk (HDLk )H}. (5)
In this paper, we assume the uplink and downlink channels
are reciprocal, i,e,
H
UL
k = (H
DL
k )
T , (6)
but the channel estimations are affected by noise. The exten-
sion to channel non-reciprocity caused by the time difference
and hardware imperfection is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Problem Statement
An intuitive approach is extending existing pairwise PKG
approaches via allocating orthogonal pilots among UTs.
Firstly, in the downlink channel probing, the BS broadcasts
the pilot signal, SDL ∈ CM×M , and the received signal of
the kth UT is given by
Y
DL
k = H
DL
k S
DL +NDLk , (7)
where NDLk ∈ CNk×M is the Gaussian noise at UT k. To
estimate the perfect CSI, the pilot signal should satisfy the
orthogonality, i.e., SDL(SDL)H = IM . By the least square
(LS) estimation, UT k estimates his downlink CSI as
Z
DL
k = Y
DL
k (S
DL)H = HDLk +N
DL
k (S
DL)H . (8)
Next, in the uplink channel probing, all the UTs send the
pilot signals, SULk ∈ CNk×N , k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} to the BS
simultaneously, where N =
∑
kNk is the total number of
UTs’ antennas. The received signal of BS is
Y
UL =
K∑
k=1
H
UL
k S
UL
k +N
UL. (9)
4where NUL ∈ CNk×N is the Gaussian noise at the BS. The
BS estimates the uplink CSI of UT k as
Z
UL
k = Y
UL(SULk )
H = HULk S
UL
k (S
UL
k )
H+
H
DL
k
K∑
k′ 6=k
S
UL
k′ (S
UL
k )
H +NUL(SULk )
H . (10)
To distinguish each UT, the pilot signals of different UTs are
designed to satisfy the orthogonality requirement, i.e.,
S
UL
i (S
UL
j )
H =
{
INi , i = j
0Ni×Nj , i 6= j. (11)
Therefore, (10) can be further reduced to
Z
UL
k = H
UL
k +N
UL(SULk )
H . (12)
When SDL and SULk are unitary, the noise N
DL
k (S
DL)H and
N
UL(SULk )
H have the same distribution as NDLk and N
UL
because Gaussian distribution is isotropic and thereby unitarily
invariant.
According to (6), the BS and UT k obtain very similar
channel estimations of ZULk ≈ ZDLk . Then, they vectorize
the estimations zULk = vec(Z
UL
k ) and z
DL
k = vec(Z
DL
k ),
which are chosen as channel characteristics for key gener-
ation. By employing quantization, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification, the BS and UT k finally generate
consistent secret key κk.
However, this intuitive approach has two issues as follows.
1) Define the duration of one round of channel probing as
Tp = TD+TU+TSwitch, where TSwitch is the switching
time from downlink to uplink, TD and TU are the
pilot transmission time in the downlink and the uplink,
respectively. This time needs to be deliberately kept
smaller than the channel coherence time, so that BS and
UTs can obtain highly correlated CSI in a TDD system.
However, in this case, Tp = (M+
∑
kNk)∆T+TSwitch,
where ∆T is the symbol transmission time. To distin-
guish different antennas of different UTs, the length of
uplink pilots scales with the number of antennas Nk as
well as the number of UTs K . When M , K and Nk are
large, it becomes very challenge to accomplish channel
probing within the coherence time.
2) Because of the spatial correlation of the antennas, the
elements of zULk and z
DL
k are highly auto-correlated, re-
sulting to long 0s and 1s in the quantized bit sequences.
Traditionally, preprocessing approaches, e.g., PCA, are
used to reduce the auto-correlation. However, due to the
large scale of antennas at both BS and UTs in the future
wireless communications, it is complicated to perform
PCA algorithm for zULk and z
DL
k with a large dimension
of MNk.
To sum up, the core problems are how to reduce the
length of pilots and the high dimension of channel matrix in
the multi-user massive MIMO system. Fortunately, literature
and field measurements have shown that the beam domain
channel matrix reveals the sparse property in typical scenarios
[17], [18]. Hence, we propose a new channel dimensionality
reduction (CDR)-based key generation scheme to address the
above problems.
IV. GENERAL CDR-BASED KEY GENERATION SCHEME
In massive MIMO channels, a few dominant elements
contain the most relevant channel information. To reduce the
dimensions, we first introduce the beam domain transform
and then propose the corresponding key generation scheme.
The achievable secret key rate in the proposed scheme is also
derived.
A. Beam Domain Transform
Beam domain transform samples the original physical chan-
nel by two series of uniformly distributed beams/angles over
[0, 2pi], i.e., transmitting and receiving beams/angles. Accord-
ing to [19], the beam domain channel is
H˜
DL
k = A
H
UT,kH
DL
k ABS , (13)
where
AUT,k = [aUT,k(θ1), aUT,k(θ2), . . . , aUT,k(θNk)] ∈ CNk×Nk
(14)
and
ABS = [aBS(ϕ1), aBS(ϕ2), . . . , aBS(ϕM )] ∈ CM×M (15)
are the sampling matrices at the kth UT and the BS, respec-
tively. They satisfy that AHUT,kAUT,k = I, A
H
BSABS = I.
The (n,m)-th element of H˜DLk represents the channel gains
from AoD ϕm to AoA θn, where ϕm and θn are the mth and
nth sample angles, which satisfy that sin(ϕm) = 2m/M − 1
and sin(θn) = 2n/Nk − 1 [20]. When the antenna spacing is
half wavelength, i.e., d = λ/2, the matrices AUT and ABS
become the unitary discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrix,
defined as [21]
[AUT,k]n1,n2 =
1√
Nk
exp(−j2pi(n1 − 1)(n2 −Nk/2)/Nk)
[ABS ]m1,m2 =
1√
M
exp(−j2pi(m1 − 1)(m2 −M/2)/M).
(16)
When the number of antennas tends to infinity, the beam
domain channel H˜DLk exhibits the spatial resolution as follows
[18].
Proposition 1: When the number of antennas grows to
infinity, the beam domain channel H˜DLk tends to G
DL
k , i.e.,
for arbitrary n and m,
lim
M,Nk→∞
[H˜DLk −GDLk ]n,m = 0, (17)
where GDLk ∈ CNk×M is given by
[GDLk ]n,m =
NP∑
p=1
αk,pδ(θk,p − arcsin(2n/Nk − 1))
×δ(ϕk,p − arcsin(2m/M − 1)). (18)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: From the definition of GDLk in (18), for each n
and m, there is at most one path p simultaneously satisfying
θk,p = arcsin(2n/Nk − 1) and ϕk,p = arcsin(2m/M − 1).
This indicates that one element in GDLk represents channel
5gains from one AoD ϕk,p to one AoA θk,p and different
elements represent channel gains corresponding to different
AoAs and AoDs. As there are NP paths, the number of non-
zero entries in matrixGDLk is NP . When the BS and UT k are
equipped with a large (but finite) number of antennas, the beam
domain channel matrix H˜DLk,p can be approximated by G
DL
k .
In this case, H˜DLk is a very sparse matrix with NP dominant
elements corresponding to the paths. Moreover, these elements
become independent with each other as long as these paths are
independent.
Define the beam domain channel covariance matrices at the
BS and kth UT as
R˜BS,k = E{(H˜DLk )HH˜DLk } = AHBSRBS,kABS ,
R˜UT,k = E{H˜DLk (H˜DLk )H} = AHUT,kRUT,kAUT,k, (19)
respectively. When the number of antennas grows to infinity,
R˜BS,k and R˜UT,k tend to diagonal matrices with the diagonal
elements given by
lim
M→∞
[R˜BS,k]m,m −
NP∑
p=1
|αk,p|2δ(ϕk,p − arcsin(2m/M − 1))
= 0,
lim
Nk→∞
[R˜UT,k]n,n −
NP∑
p=1
|αk,p|2δ(θk,p − arcsin(2n/Nk − 1))
= 0. (20)
The mth diagonal element in R˜BS,k represents the channel
gains of the mth transmit beam (ϕk,p = arcsin(2m/M − 1)),
and the nth diagonal element in R˜UT,k represents the channel
gains of the nth receive beam (θk,p = arcsin(2n/N − 1)).
The beam domain channel covariance matrices also reveal the
angular resolution of the channel gains.
From the above analysis, one can observe that the repre-
sentation in the beam domain channel brings the following
benefits. Firstly, in the beam domain, the channel matrix
reveals the sparse property, i.e., only a few elements contain
the most channel information, which reduce the dimension of
channel estimation. Secondly, as the number of antennas at
the BS and UT increases, the elements of the channel matrix
become mutually independent, reducing the redundancy, which
is particularly desirable in secret key generation. Thirdly, with
a large number of antennas at the BS, the beam domain
transform matrix at the BSABS is independent of UTs and we
can use one identical matrix to transform channel matrices of
different UTs into the beam domain. Such property is desirable
in multi-user secret key generation.
B. Key Generation Scheme Based on CDR
In the beam domain, only a few elements contain the most
channel information, which motivates us to propose a general
framework for multi-user secret key generation, as portrayed in
Fig. 2. The UT and the BS transmit sounding signals to acquire
the statistical CSI. During the parameter design stage, the BS
and UTs design precoding and receiving matrices based on the
statistical CSI, in order to reduce the dimension of channel
estimation. Then, the BS and UTs estimate the effective
Downlink sounding
Uplink sounding
Parameter design Parameter design
Channel probing Channel probing
Information 
reconciliation
Privacy 
amplification
Information 
reconciliation
Privacy 
amplification
Quantization Quantization
Downlink sounding
Uplink sounding
Syndrome
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of CDR based secret key generation scheme.
channel parameters with high correlations. After quantiza-
tion, the information reconciliation and privacy amplification
procedures are used to generate consistent and private secret
keys, similarly with the point-to-point secret key generation.
Information reconciliation and privacy amplification are thus
not particularly designed or optimized in this paper.
In this paper, we focus on the first two steps, i.e., parameter
design and channel probing, which is relatively different from
that in the point-to-point secret key generation.
1) Parameter design: In this step, BS and UTs design
the precoding and receiving matrix according to their
statistical CSI. Firstly, in the uplink, each UT employs
one antenna to transmit the sounding signals. Then,
the BS estimates the covariance matrix and designs
the precoding matrix Pk with equal power allocation
P
H
k Pk = I. Next, in the downlink, the BS employs
the precoding matrix to transmit the downlink sounding
signals and UTs estimate the statistical CSI information
of the covariance matrix at the UT side and design the
receiving matrix Ck satisfying C
H
k Ck = I.
2) Channel probing:In this step, BS and UTs probe the
channel alternatively and construct the reciprocal chan-
nel characteristics with the help of the precoding and
receiving matrix. Firstly, the BS transmits the down-
link pilot signals by the precoding matrix P and UTs
preprocess the received signals by the matrix CH to
obtain the reciprocal channel parameters. Next, each UT
employs the matrix C∗ to transmit the pilot signals. The
BS utilizes the precoding matrix P to preprocess the
received signals and estimate the effective channel.
3) Quantization: After channel probing, using channel
quantization alternating (CQA) scheme [22], the BS and
each UT quantize the effective channel measurement to
generate the initial secret keys.
Remark 2: The parameter design is proposed specifically
for multi-user massive MIMO secret key generation, which
is used to reduce the channel estimation dimension, as well
as the inter-user interference. The dimensions of Pk and C
H
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Fig. 3. Channel probing in secret key generation scheme.
are M ×Me and Ne × Nk respectively, where Me and Ne
are the reduced dimensions at the BS and UT, which are
approximately equal to the number of paths NP , far smaller
than M and Nk. Then, we only need to estimate the effective
channel with Ne × Me, significantly reducing the channel
estimation dimension. Moreover, from the analysis of channel
characteristics, one can observe that the channel gains of
one UT are concentrated within a few beams (directions),
which has the potential to separate different UTs by different
beams. In addition, the precoding and receiving matrices are
determined by the statistical CSI, which can be obtained by
some time and frequency resources [18].
Once the parameter design is completed, the BS and UTs
can perform multiple channel probing rounds. Each channel
probing round, including the uplink and downlink channel
sounding, should be completed within one coherence time slot,
where the instantaneous CSI keeps constant [23]. Different
channel probing rounds operate in different channel coherence
time slots, and the instantaneous CSI varies along time,
resulting in the variation of the generated secret keys.
The downlink and uplink probing process is illustrated
in Fig. 3. Let P = [P1,P2, · · · ,PK ] and CH =
[CH1 ,C
H
2 , · · · ,CHK ] denote the precoding and receiving matri-
ces in the downlink transmission, respectively. Then, C∗ and
P
T are used as precoding and receiving matrices in the uplink
transmission.
Specifically, let SDLk ∈ CMe×TD denote the downlink
pilot from BS to UT k within TD time slots, which satisfies
S
DL
k (S
DL
k )
H = I. After multiplying the pilot signals by the
precoding matrix Pk, the BS transmits the summation of all
the UTs. Then, UT k multiplies the received signal by the
receiving matrix CHk , given by
Y
DL
k = C
H
k H
DL
k PkS
DL
k +C
H
k H
DL
k
∑
k′ 6=k
Pk′S
DL
k′ +C
H
k Nk.
(21)
By the LS estimation, UT k estimates the downlink CSI as
Z
DL
k = Y
DL
k (S
DL
k )
H = CHk H
DL
k Pk
+CHk H
DL
k
∑
k′ 6=k
Pk′S
DL
k′ (S
DL
k )
H +CHk Nk(S
DL
k )
H . (22)
In the uplink transmission, let SULk ∈ CNe×TU denote the
pilot transmitted by UT k within TU time slots, satisfying
S
UL
k (S
UL
k )
H = I. The kth UT transmits pilot signals by the
matrix C∗k, and the BS receives the summation of all the
UTs’ signals. Then, multiplying by the receiving matrix PTk ,
which is transpose of the precoding matrix in the downlink,
the received signal of UT k at the BS can be expressed as
Y
UL
k = P
T
kH
UL
k C
∗
kS
UL
k +P
T
k
∑
k′ 6=k
H
UL
k′ C
∗
k′S
UL
k′ +P
T
kN
(23)
where YULk ∈ CMe×TU is the received signals of time length
TU . By employing the LS estimation, the estimated effective
channel of UT k can be expressed as
Z
UL
k = Y
UL(SULk )
H = PTkH
UL
k C
∗
k
+PTk
∑
k′ 6=k
H
UL
k′ C
∗
k′S
UL
k′ (S
UL
k )
H +PTkN(S
UL
k )
H . (24)
Remark 3: In the uplink and downlink transmission, the BS
and UTs vectorize the estimated effective channel matrices
Z
UL
k and Z
DL
k and employ them to generate the secret key,
where the reciprocal component between the BS and UT k is
C
H
k H
DL
k Pk with a small dimension of Ne×Me. In this way,
the dimension of channel characteristics is reduced by η =
M×Nk
Ne×Me
times. The dimensions of Me and Ne are very small
compared with the number of antennas, therefore the reduction
η is very significant. In addition, the duration of one round
of channel probing Tp is reduced from (M +
∑
kNk)∆T +
TSwitch to (Me +Ne)∆T + TSwitch.
Let SDLk′k = S
DL
k′ (S
DL
k )
H (or SULk′k = (S
UL
k′ (S
UL
k )
H)T )
represent the covariance matrix of the downlink (or uplink)
pilot signals, where SDLkk = S
UL
kk = I. Moreover, as the uplink
and downlink channel are reciprocal, for the simplicity of
notation, the downlink channel HDLk is denoted as Hk, and
the uplink channel is HULk = (Hk)
T . Then, the vectorized
channel matrices can be expressed as
z
DL
k =vec(Z
DL
k ) =
∑
k′
((
Pk′S
DL
k′k
)T ⊗CHk ) vec(Hk)
+ vec(CHk Nk) (25)
z
UL
k =vec((Z
UL
k )
T ) =
∑
k′
(
P
T
k ⊗ SULk′kCk′
)
vec(Hk′ )
+ vec(NTPk). (26)
7Although the uplink and downlink channel of the kth UT are
identical, the interference terms between UTs are not recipro-
cal. Specifically, in the downlink transmission, the interference
received at the kth UT is the summation of the transmitted
signals of the k′th UT propagating through the channel of the
kth UT Hk, while in the uplink transmission, the interference
received at the BS for the kth UT is the summation of the
transmitted signals of the k′th UT propagating through the
channel of different UTs Hk′ . Thus, the interference will also
reduce the agreement.
C. Secret Key Rate
When the BS communicates with one UT, other UTs are po-
tential non-colluding curious users1. Under the TDD operation,
each UT cannot transmit and receive signals at the same time.
The ith UT only has the channel observation in the downlink
transmission. Thus, the key rate is the minimum mutual
information given other UT’s observations. The number of
secure bits for the link from the BS to UT k in the mutual
information can be expressed as [24]
Ik = min
i6=k
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k |zDLi ). (27)
Remark 4: We assume that the distance between the BS
and each UT is several orders of magnitude larger than the
wavelength, i.e., there is no UT close to the BS. Then, in the
uplink transmission, the channel from one UT to the BS is
independent of that from one UT to another UT. Moreover, as
UTs transmit signals at the same time and frequency block,
they cannot receive signals from other UTs. Thus, the secret
key rate is the minimum mutual information between zDLk and
z
UL
k on the condition of z
DL
i .
When the channel estimations of different UTs are indepen-
dent, the secret key rate degrades to
Ik = I(z
DL
k ; z
UL
k ). (28)
In massive MIMO communications, when the beam domain
channels of different UTs are non-overlapping, i.e., the channel
covariance matrices at the BS are orthogonal, given by
R˜BS,kR˜BS,i = 0, k 6= i, (29)
the channel vectors of UT k and UT i are independent.
Then, the secret rate I(zDLk ; z
UL
k |zDLi ) can be degraded as
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k ) and no secret keys are leaked to potential curious
UTs [25].
When the beam domain channels are overlapping, we should
consider the information leakage to other UTs. But we can al-
ways select non-overlapping beams for different UTs and then
the selected channel information is independent. Thus, we can
also use (28) to calculate the secret key rate. The overlapping
case will be discussed in more detail in Section V-B.
Denote the precoding and receiving matrices in the beam
domain as P˜k = A
H
BSPk and C˜k = A
H
UT,kCk, respectively.
Let Vk = Λ
1/2
k
(∑
k′ (P˜k′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)H
and Vkk′ =
1This paper focuses on the non-colluding scenario, where no information
is shared among the curious users. The colluding case, where curious users
share their received signals with each other, can be studied in the future.
Λ
1/2
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗SULk′kC˜Hk′
)H
, where Λk = E{vec(H˜k)vec(H˜k)H}
is the full correlation of the beam domain channel. We can
compute the secret key rate of UT k as follows.
Theorem 1: When the channels of different UTs become
independent, the secret key rate of the kth UT is given by
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k )
=− logdet
(
I−Vkk
(∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′+
(
P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU
))−1
V
H
kk
×Vk
(
V
H
k Vk + ITD ⊗CHk Ck
)−1
V
H
k
)
. (30)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 5: Note that when the number of UTs is one
(i.e., there is only one UT), the secret key rate reduced to
the single user secret key rate, which is a special case of
(30). Moreover, the secret key rate (30) is complicated, which
depends on the precoding and receiving vectors, as well as the
covariance matrices of pilot signals. To estimate the effective
CSI, the pilot signals of one UT should be orthogonal, i.e.,
S
DL
kk = I and S
UL
kk = I [26]. When the pilot signals between
UTs are orthogonal, i.e., SDLk′k = 0 and S
UL
k′k = 0, there
is no interference between UTs. The secret key rate can be
simplified as
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k ) = − log det
(
I−Λ1/2k
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
)
×
(
I+
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
))−1(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
×
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
)(
I+
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
))−1
×
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λ
1/2
k
)
. (31)
However, for the orthogonal pilots between UTs, the pilot
overhead scales with the number of UTs, which is quite
large in multi-user communication systems. In general, due
to the short coherent time, employing the orthogonal pilots
between users is impractical. Alternatively, pilot signals can
be reused between UTs, i.e., SDLk′k = I and S
UL
k′k = I. Under
this condition, there exists inter-user interference and we will
design the precoding and receiving matrices to reduce it.
V. OPTIMIZATION DESIGN WITH PILOT REUSE
In this section, we consider the CDR-based secret key
generation scheme design under the pilot reuse case, where
different UTs transmit the identical pilot signals. In this
case, we first design the precoding and receiving matrices
maximizing the secret key rate and then analyze the security
when the channels of different UTs are correlated.
A. Design of Precoding and Receiving Matrices
Under the pilot reuse case, the inter-user interference will
affect secret key agreement. Therefore, we need to design the
8precoding and receiving matrices to maximize the sum secret
key rate. Generally, the precoding and receiving matrices
contain the transmit directions as well as the transmitted power
on each direction. To reduce the interference, we focus on
the transmit direction design and consider the equal power
allocation of each direction, which can be expressed as
max
P˜k,C˜k
Rsum =
∑
k
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k )
s.t. P˜Hk P˜k = I
C˜
H
k C˜k = I, (32)
where the secret key rate is calculated as
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k ) = − log det
(
I−Λ1/2k
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)H
×
(
I+
∑
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk′
)
Λk′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk′
)H)−1
×
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(∑
k′
(P˜k′ )
∗ ⊗ C˜k
)
×
(
I+
(∑
k′
(P˜k′ )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(∑
k′
(P˜k′ )
∗ ⊗ C˜k
))−1
×
(∑
k′
(P˜k′ )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λ
1/2
k
)
. (33)
Although we consider the sum secret key rate maximization,
the key rate differences among UTs are not large. As we
consider the equal power allocation for different beams, most
UTs can achieve similar secret key rates.
As in the objective function (33), the optimization matri-
ces P˜k and C˜k are involved both inside and outside the
matrix inversion operation, the function (33) is not convex
on P˜k and C˜k, resulting in the non-convex problem (32),
which is difficult to solve globally. In order to reduce the
computational complexity and lower the pilot overhead, we
utilize the interference neutralization approach [25] to mitigate
the interference, i.e., for arbitrary matrix C˜k′ (k
′ 6= k), the
precoding matrix P˜k satisfies
(P˜Tk ⊗ C˜Hk′)Λk′ = 0, k′ 6= k. (34)
This constraint indicates that the precoding matrix P˜k can
eliminate the inter-user interference. Note that when the chan-
nel beams of different users are non-overlapping, the precoding
matrices corresponds to different beams, and thus we have
P˜
H
k R˜BS,k′ = 0, k
′ 6= k. (35)
Therefore, the constraint (34) can be easily satisfied.
Under this constraint, problem (32) maximizing the sum
secret key rate can be decomposed into the following sub-
problems maximizing the secret key rate of each user
min
P˜k,C˜k
log det
(
I−Λ1/2k
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
)(
I+
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
×
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
))−1(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
)
×
(
I+
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k
))−1(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λ
1/2
k
)
s.t. P˜Hk P˜k = I
C˜
H
k C˜k = I. (36)
Remark 6: The secret key rate in (36) is equal to that using
orthogonal pilots in (31). This means that when the precoding
matrix P˜k satisfies condition (34), UTs reusing the identical
pilot signals approaches the performance with orthogonal pilot
signals. Both schemes can mitigate the inter-user interference.
The difference is that orthogonal pilot scheme uses orthogonal
pilot signals to separate different UTs, which requires large pi-
lot overhead, while interference neutralization scheme designs
the precoding matrices to eliminate the interference, which is
independent of pilot signals between UTs.
Note that in problem (36), the secret key rate depends only
on the Kronecker product P˜∗k ⊗ C˜k. Define Uk =
(
P˜
∗
k ⊗
C˜k
)
, which is also a tall unitary matrix. We first consider the
matrixUk design maximizing the secret key rate, and then, we
construct the precoding and receiving matrices satisfying the
interference neutralization constraint. The matrix Uk design
problem can be expressed as
min
Uk
log det
(
I−
(
Λ
1/2
k Uk
(
I+UHk ΛkUk
)−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k
)2)
s.t. UHk Uk = I. (37)
The solution of problem (37) is obtained as follows:
Theorem 2: The optimal Uk maximizing the secret key rate
is
Uk =
[
eη1 eη2 · · · eηMeNe
]
, (38)
where ei = [0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] is a unit vector with the
ith unit element and ηi is the index of the ith sorted eigenvalue
of matrix Λk(I+Λk)
−1. The optimal rate is
Rk = −
MeNe∑
i=1
logλi
(
I−Λ2k(I+Λk)−2
)
. (39)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 7: To maximize the secret key rate of the kth UT,
the optimal Uk consists of the unit vectors corresponding to
the sorted diagonal elements in Λk. However, as Uk has the
structure P˜∗k ⊗ C˜k, in general cases, it cannot satisfy the
optimal condition (38). Next, we will employ the channel
properties and Theorem 2 to construct the precoding and
receiving vectors P˜k and C˜k.
As Uk is consist of vectors ei, the beam domain precoding
and receiving matrices P˜k and C˜k have the similar structure,
which only need to select corresponding beams. This indicates
that the optimal precoding and receiving matrices Pk and
Ck are consist of the eigenvectors of the channel covariance
matrices, i.e., the precoding matrixPk is a sub-matrix ofABS ,
while the receiving matrix Ck is a sub-matrix of AUT,k .
Moreover, recalling Proposition 1, as the number of anten-
nas tends to infinity, the beam domain channel matrix H˜k
approaches the matrix Gk, where different elements represent
the channel gains from different AoDs to different AoAs.
The channel gains are concentrated in a few elements in Gk.
9Specifically, suppose that there are NP paths, corresponding
to NP AoAs and NP AoDs. Then, the BS selects the strongest
NP beams, i.e., the precoding matrix P˜k is given by
P˜k =
[
eηt,k,1 eηt,k,2 · · · eηt,k,NP
]
(40)
where ηt,k,1 is the index of the sorted eigenvalue of matrix
RBS,k. Similarly, UT k selects the strongest NP receiving
directions, i.e., the receiving matrix C˜k is given by
C˜k =
[
eηr,k,1 eηr,k,2 · · · eηr,k,NP
]
(41)
where ηr,k,1 is the index of the sorted eigenvalue of matrix
RUT,k. The number of paths NP is relatively small, and Me
and Ne can be chosen equal to the number of paths. Using
the precoding and receiving matrices, we can construct Uk =
P˜
∗
k ⊗ C˜k to obtain the N2P elements in Λk, which contains
the channel information of the NP paths. This approach can
significantly reduce the pilot overhead and fits well to massive
MIMO channel model and precoding [27].
B. Security Analysis with Overlapping Beams
In the above analysis, we assume that the channel matri-
ces of different UTs are independent. This assumption can
be easily satisfied for the non-overlapping case where the
channel beams of different UTs are non-overlapping. However,
different UTs may have overlapping beams in reality. For
example, when two UTs are close to each other, part of their
channels may suffer the same propagation paths, resulting in
the overlapping beams, i.e.,
R˜BS,kR˜BS,k′ 6= 0, k′ 6= k. (42)
Since the channels of the overlapping beams between R˜BS,k
and R˜BS,k′ are highly correlated, the independent assumption
does not hold any more. Thus, the information leakage should
be considered for the overlapping case design.
Next, we analyze the information leakage ratio for the
overlapping case. Note that for the kth UT, the beam domain
channel elements in H˜k are statistically independent and thus
the secret key rate can be expressed as the summation of the
key rate of each beam. Moreover, as UTs are assumed as non-
colluding curious users, the information leakage is determined
by the UT with the highest correlation. Thus, we focus on the
information leakage on one overlapping beam with two UTs
as an example.
Suppose that both UT 1 and UT 2 occupy the identical
beam b at the BS. Denote the channel gains from beam b at
the BS to the dominant beam at UT 1 (or UT 2) as h1 (or h2).
Assume that both h1 and h2 have the unit attenuation power,
i.e., E{h21} = E{h22} = 1. Define the information leakage
ratio as γ = (Rh −R1)/Rh, where Rh is the secret key rate
with the independent channel assumption and R1 is the key
rate when the channels are correlated. Since the correlation
reduces the secret key rate, we always have Rh ≥ R1. Then,
we can calculate γ as follows.
Theorem 3: The information leakage ratio can be expressed
as
γ = 1−
log ((1+σ
2)2−ρ2)2
(1+σ2)(σ6+3σ4−2σ2ρ2+2σ2)
log (1+σ
2)2
σ2(2+σ2)
, (43)
where σ2 is the noise variance and ρ is the cross channel
correlation defined as
ρ =
E{h1h2}
E{h21}E{h22}
= E{h1h2}. (44)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 8: The information leakage ratio given by (43) is
complicated, depending on the correlation ρ as well as the
noise variance σ2. Next, we will consider a special case. From
Appendix D, when ρ is 1 or −1, the information leakage is
the highest, which can be calculated as
γ =
log 3+2σ
2
σ2(6+11σ2+6σ4+σ6)
log (1+σ
2)2
σ2(2+σ2)
. (45)
For high SNRs (low σ2), as σ2 tends to 0, the information
leakage ratio becomes
lim
σ2→0
γ = 1, (46)
which indicates that the secret key rate goes to zero and
vanishes.
From the above analysis, one can observe that the chan-
nel correlation is mainly caused by the overlapping channel
beams. Further, when the channel of the overlapping beams is
highly correlated, the information leakage ratio tends to 1. This
result reveals that the correlated overlapping beams provide
little secret key rate. Therefore, in the multi-user secret key
generation, when two UTs have overlapping channel beams,
the BS should allocate non-overlapping transmitting beams to
different UTs, i.e., the precoding vector P˜k satisfies
P˜kR˜BS,k′ = 0, k
′ 6= k. (47)
This indicates that the allocated transmitting beams for the kth
UT are not overlapping with the channel beams of other UTs.
Under this condition, the constraint (34) is satisfied, and the
channel matrices of the allocated beams for different UTs are
independent.
C. A Holistic Parameter Design Algorithm
Combined with the result of above security analysis, we
propose a holistic parameter design algorithm as illustrated in
Algorithm 1.
With the help of designed parameters, the BS and UTs can
extract reciprocal channel information of the non-overlapping
beams, on which the channels of different UTs are indepen-
dent. Therefore, we can complete the following key generation
steps using the same approach as described in SectionIV-B.
It is noteworthy that the design of the matrices P˜k and
C˜k depends on the statistical CSI R˜BS,k and R˜UT,k. As
the statistical CSI changes on a larger time scale than the
instantaneous CSI, it is not necessary to design P˜k and C˜k
for each secret key generation round. After designing P˜k and
C˜k, they can be used to generate secret keys until the statistical
CSI changes. Also note that an offline design is possible.
Depending on the statistical CSI scenario, we can choose the
corresponding pilots.
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Algorithm 1 Parameter design.
Require: RBS,k and RUT,k
Ensure: Pk and Ck
1: At the BS side:
2: for k = 1 : K do
3: Calculate the beam domain channel covariance matrix
R˜BS,k according to (19).
4: Select the strongest non-overlapping beams P˜k ac-
cording to (40) and (47).
5: Construct the precoding matrix Pk = ABSP˜k.
6: end for
7: At the UT side:
8: for k = 1 : K do
9: Calculate the beam domain channel covariance matrix
R˜UT,k according to (19).
10: Select the strongest beams C˜k according to (41).
11: Construct the receiving matrix Ck = AUT C˜k.
12: end for
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we employ the numerical results to illustrate
the performance of secret key generation in multi-user massive
MIMO wireless communication systems. A BS, equipped with
M = 128 antennas, simultaneously communicates withK = 6
UTs, each with Nk = 4 antennas. Here, we focus on massive
antennas at the BS, which significantly affect the performance
for the multi-user case. We consider the physical channel
model, where there are NP = 6 paths for each UT. We
consider a ULA topology at the BS with 0.5λ antenna spacing.
The channel is generated according to (1), where the AoDs and
AoAs are randomly distributed.
Fig. 4 presents the secret key rate of single user to confirm
that our proposed CDR based secret key generation scheme
is also suitable for the single user case. We compare the
secret key rate of the designed matrices U and P˜ with that of
perfect CSI. The perfect CSI provides the complete channel
information and achieves the highest secret key rate. Here, we
set the matrix C˜ = I and considerMe = 4 andMe = 6 cases.
From the results, when Me = 6, the secret key rate of optimal
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Fig. 5. Multi-user channel gains distribution in the beam domain.
U and the designed P˜ can approach that of perfect CSI,
indicating that by employing the precoding matrix P˜, the BS
and the UT can obtain the almost perfect channel information,
significantly reducing the dimension of the channel estimation
and the pilot overhead. When Me = 4, the secret key rate
approaches that of Me = 6, which contains the most channel
power with lower overhead.
Next, we consider the multi-user secret key generation and
illustrate an example of multi-user channel gains distribution
in the beam domain in Fig. 5. The BS employs the eigenmatrix
of the channel ABS to generate M fixed beams of different
directions, where the m-th beam is corresponding to the
direction sin(ϕm) = 2m/M − 1. Then, according to the
particular location of the UT, the BS selects a number of beams
from the M beams to generate secret key with him.
When six UTs are distributed in different positions, the
channel gains of each UT are concentrated within a number of
beams (or directions), different UTs occupy non-overlapping
channel beams. The attenuation between the adjacent UTs
is about 20 dB, significantly reducing inter-user interference.
This result indicates that the BS equipped with massive
antennas has the potential to achieve multi-user secret key
generation.
Fig. 6 compares the secret key rate for different number
of users. From the results, we can find that as the number
of UTs increases, the secret key rate grows up approximately
linearly. For example, the key rate of 4 UTs approaches twice
than that of 2 UTs. However, as the number of UTs continues
increasing, the key rate of each UT becomes lower, due to the
interference or information leakage among UTs.
In multi-user secret key generation, the bottleneck is the pi-
lot overhead. Considering the negative effect of pilot overhead,
we define the unit secret key rate as
Runit = Rsum/T, (48)
where T is the pilot overhead, scaled with the dimension of
the effective channel Me and Ne. As the number of antennas
at each UT is 4, we set Ne = Nk = 4. Fig. 7 compares
the unit secret key rate of reused pilot with Me = 4 and
Me = 6 with orthogonal pilot scheme. As the pilot overhead
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Fig. 7. Unit secret key rate comparison for multiple UTs of orthogonal pilot
and reused pilot.
is extremely large for orthogonal pilot scheme, the unit secret
key rate suffers serious loss. The reused pilot scheme with
Me = 6 achieves the highest rate and the rate of scheme with
Me = 4 is close to that of Me = 6.
Fig. 8 compares the unit secret key rate of overlapping and
non-overlapping transmitting beam schemes, when the channel
beams are overlapping between different UTs. For the overlap-
ping scheme, the BS allocates the strongest transmitting beams
for each UT, some of which may be overlapping with other
UTs, while for the non-overlapping scheme, the BS allocates
the non-overlapping strongest transmitting beams for each UT.
For the overlapping transmitting beam scheme, to estimate the
channel of overlapping beams for different users, orthogonal
pilot is used. Thus, the overhead is a little larger than that of
non-overlapping transmitting beam scheme. Here, we do not
consider the information leakage of the overlapping beams
and only consider the interference between users. We observe
that the unit secret key rates of non-overlapping schemes are
higher than that of overlapping schemes. The non-overlapping
scheme with Me = 6 achieves the highest rate.
Then, we present the information leakage ratio when the
channels of different UTs are correlated, as shown in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9. Information leakage ratio with different correlation coefficients.
If the channels of UT 1 and UT 2 are correlated, they
may observe similar channel measurements, resulting in the
information leakage. When UT 2 is a potential eavesdropper,
it can guess part of the key of UT 1, according to its correlated
channel measurement. From the result, when the correlation
coefficient is 1, the information leakage ratio increases as the
SNR grows up. When the correlation coefficient is less than 1,
the information leakage ratio increases in the low and middle
SNR regions and decreases in the high SNR regions. This is
because in the high SNR regions, the BS can obtain the precise
channel information and extract the difference between them
to generate the keys. However, the information leakage is still
large when the correlation is high.
Next, we evaluate the bit disagreement ratios (BDR) per-
formance of legitimate user and curious user, as shown in
Fig. 10. The BDR is defined as the ratio of the number
of the disagreement bits to the number of total bits of the
initial secret key, which is the quantization result of channel
measurement. In the figure, the curve of “legitimate user”
refers to the BDR between the BS and each UT, while the
curve of “curious user” refers to the BDR of two different
UTs, which presents the key disagreement between different
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Fig. 10. BDR comparison for legitimate and curious UTs.
UTs. Moreover, we also illustrate the BDR of single user
case, which is the best case without inter-user interference.
From the results, we can find that the BDR of “legitimate
user” approaches that of “single user”, which indicates that
the BDR performance of our proposed multi-user secret key
generation approaches that of single-user key generation. The
BDR of “curious user” remains high (about 0.5) for varied
SNRs, which means that the quantized channel measurements
of different UTs are different, one UT cannot guess the key
of other UT based on his observation.
Finally, we evaluate the randoness of the initial key (before
privacy amplification) via the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) random test suite [28]. A tested
bit sequence passes a test when the p-value is greater than
the threshold, usually chosen as 0.01. We perform 9 NIST
statistical tests for 10000 trials, and each initial key has a
length of 256 bits. The pass ratios and the averaged p-values
are summarized in Table I. For each test, the pass ratio is
higher than 90% and the averaged p-value is significantly
greater than 0.01. The results reflect a good randomness of
the initial key generated via our proposed approach.
TABLE I
NIST RANDOM TEST RESULT.
Pass ratio P-value
Approximate entropy 0.9199 0.4233
Runs 0.9262 0.4590
Ranking 0.9128 0.3810
Longest runs of ones 0.9717 0.3701
Frequency 0.9926 0.5254
FFT 0.9983 0.5800
Block frequency 0.9949 0.5466
Cumulative sums 0.9974 0.4997
Serial 0.9255 0.4474, 0.4903
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a fundamental design and analysis
of the multi-user secret key generation in massive MIMO
wireless networks. We provided a beam domain channel
model, representing the channel gains from different transmit
directions to different receive directions. We derived a closed-
form expression of the secret key rate, which depends on
the statistical CSI and the precoding and receiving matrices.
We provided the optimal conditions for the Kronecker of the
precoding the receiving matrices and proposed an algorithm
to achieve the maximal sum secret key rate. When the beams
of different UTs are non-overlapping, the BS employs several
strongest beams of each UT to simultaneously generate secret
key. Furthermore, we provided a security analysis by consider-
ing the channel correlation between UTs. When the channels
of different UTs are correlated, the BS employs the several
strongest non-overlapping beams of each UT to generate secret
key. Numerical results demonstrate the performance improve-
ment of our proposed multi-user secret key generation scheme.
This work focuses on the sum secret key rate maximization,
while the power allocation optimization under the fairness
constraint among UTs can be further analyzed in the future.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From (13), the (n,m)th element of the beam domain
channel H˜DLk can be expressed as
[H˜DLk ]n,m = aUT,k(θn)
H
H
DL
k aBs(ϕm)
=
∑
p
αk,paUT,k(θn)
H
aUT,k(θk,p)aBS(ϕk,p)
H
aBS(ϕm).
(49)
First, we consider the calculation of aUT,k(θn)
H
aUT,k(θk,p).
As the number of UT antennas tends to infinity, there exists
θn equal to θk,p (θn = θk,p), and
aUT,k(θn)
H
aUT,k(θk,p) = 1. (50)
When θn is not equal to θk,p, we have [29]
lim
N→∞
aUT,k(θn)
H
aUT,k(θk,p)
= lim
Nk→∞
1
Nk
1− e−j 2piλ dNk(sin(θk,p)−sin(θn))
1− e−j 2piλ d(sin(θk,p)−sin(θn)) = 0. (51)
Similarly, as the number of BS antennas grows, we have
lim
M→∞
aBS(ϕk,p)
H
aBS(ϕm) = δ(ϕk,p − ϕm). (52)
Thus, the (n,m)th element of H˜k,p can be expressed as
lim
N,M→∞
[H˜DLk ]n,m −
∑
p
αk,pδ(θk, p− θn)δ(ϕk,p − ϕm) = 0.
(53)
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Assuming zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector for
each channel observation zDLk or z
UL
k , we have [30]
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k |zDLi ) = H(zDLk , zDLi ) +H(zULk , zDLi )
−H(zDLk , zULk , zDLi )−H(zDLi )
13
= log
det(RzDL
k
zDL
i
RzUL
k
zDL
i
)
det(RzDL
k
zUL
k
zDL
i
) det(RzDL
i
)
.
(54)
Specially, when the channel observations of different UTs are
uncorrelated, i.e., the channels of different UTs are indepen-
dent, the conditional mutual information (54) can be simplified
as
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k |zDLi ) = I(zDLk ; zULk ) = log
det(RzDL
k
RzUL
k
)
det(RzDL
k
zUL
k
)
,
(55)
which only depends on the correlation of uplink and downlink
channels.
We will calculate the covariance matrices RzDL
k
, RzUL
k
, and
RzDL
k
zUL
k
to obtain the secret key rate. The matrix RzDL
k
can
be calculated as
RzDL
k
=E
{∑
k′
((Pk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk )vec(Hk)vec(Hk)H
×
∑
k′
((Pk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk )H
+ (ITD ⊗CHk )vec(Nk)vec(Nk)H(ITD ⊗CHk )H
}
.
(56)
Without loss of generality, we consider the unit covariance
matrix of noise, given by
E
{
vec(Nk)vec(Nk)
H
}
= INMe . (57)
Recalling Rk = (A
∗
BS ⊗AUT )Λk(A∗BS ⊗AUT )H , we have
RzDL
k
=
∑
k′
((Pk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk )Rk
∑
k′
((Pk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk )H
+ (ITD ⊗CHk )(ITD ⊗CHk )H
=
∑
k′
((AHBSPk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk AUT )Λk
×
∑
k′
((AHBSPk′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗CHk AUT )H
+ (ITD ⊗CHk Ck). (58)
Let P˜k = A
H
BSPk and C˜k = A
H
UT,kCk. The covariance
matrix RzDL
k
can be rewritten as
RzDL
k
=
(∑
k′
(P˜k′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(∑
k′
(P˜k′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)H
+ (ITD ⊗CHk Ck). (59)
Similarly, we can calculate RzUL
k
as
RzUL
k
=
∑
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ SULk′kC˜Hk′
)
Λk′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ SULk′kC˜Hk′
)H
+ (PTkP
∗
k ⊗ ITU ). (60)
Next, we will calculate the determinant of covariance matrix
RzDL
k
zUL
k
. Note that the matrix RzDL
k
zUL
k
can be decomposed
as
RzDL
k
zUL
k
=
[ RzDL
k
RzDL
k
zUL
k
RzUL
k
zDL
k
RzUL
k
]
(61)
where RzDL
k
zUL
k
represents the covariance of zDLk and z
UL
k ,
RzDL
k
zUL
k
=E{zDLk (zULk )H}
=
(∑
k′
(P˜k′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)
Λk
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ SULkk C˜Hk
)H
.
(62)
From the determinant of the block matrix, we have
det(RzDL
k
zUL
k
)
= det(RzDL
k
) det
(
RzUL
k
−RzUL
k
zDL
k
R−1
zDL
k
RzDL
k
zUL
k
)
.
(63)
Hence, the secret key rate can be expressed as
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k ) = log
det(RzUL
k
)
det
(
RzUL
k
−RzUL
k
zDL
k
R−1
zDL
k
RzDL
k
zUL
k
)
= − log det
(
I−R−1
zUL
k
RzUL
k
zDL
k
R−1
zDL
k
RzDL
k
zUL
k
)
.
(64)
Let Vk = Λ
1/2
k
(∑
k′ (P˜k′S
DL
k′k )
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)H
and Vkk′ =
Λ
1/2
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ SULk′kC˜Hk′
)H
. Then, we can have
R−1
zUL
k
RzUL
k
zDL
k
R−1
zDL
k
RzDL
k
zUL
k
=
(∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′ + (P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU )
)−1
×VHkkVk
(
V
H
k Vk + ITD ⊗CHk Ck
)−1
V
H
k Vkk (65)
and the secret key rate is given by
I(zDLk ; z
UL
k )
= − log det

I−Vkk
(∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′ + (P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU )
)−1
×VHkkVk
(
V
H
k Vk + ITD ⊗CHk Ck
)−1
V
H
k
)
. (66)
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The sum rate can be expressed as
Rk=−logdet
(
I−
(
Λ
1/2
k Uk
(
I+UHk ΛkUk
)−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k
)2)
.
(67)
From Eq. 10.55 in [31], we have
Λ
1/2
k Uk(I+U
H
k ΛkUk)
−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k
= Λ
1/2
k Uk
(
U
H
k (I+Λk)Uk
)−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k
 Λ1/2k (I+Λk)−1Λ1/2k . (68)
Thus, the sorted eigenvalues satisfy
λi(Λ
1/2
k Uk(I+U
H
k ΛkUk)
−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k )
≤ λi(Λk(I+Λk)−1) (69)
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and we have
λi
(
I−
(
Λ
1/2
k Uk
(
I+UHk ΛkUk
)−1
U
H
k Λ
1/2
k
)2 )
≥ λi
(
I−Λ2k(I+Λk)−2
)
. (70)
Thus,
Rk = −
∑
i
logλi
(
I−
(
ΛkUk
(
I+UHk ΛkUk
)−1
U
H
k
)2 )
≤ −
∑
i
logλi
(
I−Λ2k(I+Λk)−2
)
. (71)
The equality holds only whenUk is consist of the unit vectors
with the indices of unit elements corresponding to that of the
sorted eigenvalues, i.e.,
Uk =
[
eλ1 eλ2 · · · eλMeNe
]
(72)
where ei = [0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] is a unit vector with the
ith unit element. This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The secret key rate of UT 1 corresponding to beam b is
given by
R1 = log
det
(
R(h1+n
DL
1
)(h2+n
DL
2
)R(h1+n
UL
1
)(h2+n
DL
2
)
)
det
(
R(h1+n
DL
1
)(h1+n
UL
1
)(h2+n
DL
2
)
)
det
(
R(h2+n
DL
2
)
)
(73)
where nUL1 and n
DL
1 (or n
DL
2 ) are the received noise of UT 1
(or UT 2) in the uplink and downlink transmissions. When the
variance of the noise is σ2, we can calculate Rb1 in closed-
form as
R1 = log
((1 + σ2)2 − ρ2)2
(1 + σ2)(σ6 + 3σ4 − 2σ2ρ2 + 2σ2) . (74)
Taking the derivative of Rb1 with respect to ρ, we can obtain
∂Rb1
∂ρ
=
−4ρσ2(1 + σ2 − ρ)(1 + σ2 + ρ)(1 + σ2 − ρ2)
(1 + σ2)(2σ2 + 3σ4 + σ6 − 2σ2ρ2)2 .
(75)
As ρ is in the region [−1, 1], (1 + σ2 − ρ), (1 + σ2 + ρ), and
(1 + σ2 − ρ2) in the numerator are positive. Then, when ρ is
in the region [0, 1], the derivative ∂Rb1∂ρ ≤ 0, which indicates
the rate Rb1 is monotonic decreasing. When ρ is in the region
[−1, 0], the derivation ∂Rb1∂ρ ≥ 0, which indicates the rate Rb1
is monotonic increasing. Thus, we can have the highest rate
Rh with ρ = 0 as
Rh = log
(1 + σ2)2
σ2(2 + σ2)
, (76)
and the lowest rate Rl with ρ = 1 or ρ = −1 as
Rl = log
(2 + σ2)2
3 + 4σ2 + σ4
. (77)
Thus, the information leakage ratio can be calculated as
γ = 1−
log ((1+σ
2)2−ρ2)2
(1+σ2)(σ6+3σ4−2σ2ρ2+2σ2)
log (1+σ
2)2
σ2(2+σ2)
. (78)
This completes the proof. 
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